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The Impact of Environmental, Social, and 
Governance Disclosure on Firm Value: The Role of 
CEO Power 
Abstract                                                               
Using a large cross-sectional dataset comprising of FTSE 350 listed firms, this study 
investigates whether superior environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) 
disclosure affects firm value. We find a positive association between ESG disclosure 
level and firm value, suggesting that improved transparency and accountability and 
enhanced stakeholder trust play a role in boosting firm value. We also report that 
higher CEO power enhances the ESG disclosure effect on firm value, indicating that 
stakeholders associate ESG disclosure from firms with higher CEO power with 
greater commitment to ESG practice. This evidence is strong and consistent for three 
different measures of ESG-related disclosure: the ESG, environmental and social 
disclosure scores. The results are robust to the use of an instrumental variable 
approach, and the Heckman two-stage estimation procedure. 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, the growing attention paid to issues of ‘sustainability’ has led to a 
boom in firms’ information disclosure on environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) practices. According to the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Stock Exchange 
(SSE) initiative, all big companies are expected to report their impact from 
environmental and social practice by 2030 at the latest (SSE, 2015). Evidence also 
shows that market interest in the transparency of firms’ ESG performance and practice 
is large and growing (Eccles, Serafeim & Krzus, 2011). Despite this heightened 
attention, a prudent question remains unexplored: whether or not ESG information 
disclosure prompts value creation. And, if it does, what are the drivers? The existing 
literature fails to give a definitive answer (Cho, Patten & Roberts, 2006; Garay & 
Font, 2012; Madsen & Rodgers, 2015). Our goal for this paper is to use a 
comprehensive proxy for ESG disclosure and a relatively large sample size to 
demonstrate this relationship. In addition, we attempt to examine the underlying 
drivers of the relationship by investigating the role of the chief executive officer 
(CEO) in ESG disclosure. In pursuit of this goal, we propose to extend earlier 
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applications of stakeholder theory to explain how firms generate financial value from 
ESG information disclosure. By focusing on the firms’ key decision-making party, the 
CEO, we provide empirical evidence of whether ESG disclosure is more value 
enhancing for firms whose CEOs have greater power. 
In the traditional view, the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth is the ultimate goal 
of a company. However, from a stakeholder perspective, it is argued that other parties 
are also involved in the nexus, employees, suppliers, customers, communities, banks, 
regulatory agents, etc. Analysis of the association between firm profitability and the 
satisfaction of diverse stakeholders using survey data implies that major stakeholders 
can be regarded as a community of interests and their benefits are conjoint (Preston & 
Sapienza, 1990). Therefore, we argue that firms with better ESG disclosure could be 
more attractive to both financial investors and other major stakeholders, and that the 
resulting improved relationship between firms and their multiple stakeholders will 
financially benefit the former in the long run.  
There are five arguments that particularly support our view. First, since ESG practice 
is very different from accounting practice, disclosures on ESG practice provide 
additional information to financial data. In the past 20 years, there have been growing 
demands for improved business reporting, and interestingly the focus is largely on 
encouraging companies to provide more non-financial information. This demand is 
due to the fact that the attribution of tangible assets to an entity’s market capitalisation 
plummeted from approximately 82% to about 19% between 1975 and 2009 (Eccles, 
Serafeim & Krzus, 2011). ESG disclosure, as a major part of non-financial 
information, helps to offer a greater understanding of firms’ businesses. As argued in 
Duuren, Plantinga & Scholtens (2015), ESG practice involves manufacturing 
technology, the use of raw materials, the relations with regulatory bodies and 
community, and has an influence on the business in a long run, and therefore needs 
well planned strategies. Based on such practice, ESG disclosure provides important 
additional aspects over and above financial information. This corresponds to the 
findings that additional and more diversified information in the economy improve 
price informativeness (Goldstein & Yang, 2015).  
Second, the improvement of internal management practices following from ESG 
disclosure can lead to stronger relationships with multiple stakeholders who do 
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business with those companies (Vilanova, Lozano & Arenas, 2009; Dhaliwal, Li, 
Tsang & Yang, 2011). More importantly, Chen, Goldstein & Jiang (2006) suggest that 
managers tend to learn from the information in stock prices about their own firms’ 
fundamentals and embed this knowledge in their corporate investment decisions. ESG 
disclosure thus creates a positive feedback loop: by increasing the transparency of 
ESG issues around the firm, it may further increase the incentives of the manager to 
improve the internal control mechanisms for complying with the regulations and 
serving the firm’s stakeholders’ interests (Cheng, Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014). ESG 
disclosure thus increases firm value in the long run.  
Third, with the improved availability of ESG information disclosure, the asymmetric 
information between firms and related parties can be reduced, and relationships with 
important stakeholders can be strengthened, leading to better operating performance 
through consumption, investment, favourable employment behaviour, etc., and 
consequently higher firm value. For example, if the customers/community believe that 
a firm is a good citizen based on their ESG disclosure, the former may wish to buy 
more products from it, hence increasing profitability. Likewise, a higher level of 
environmental risk may lower a supplier firm’s probability of being selected relative 
to its industry peers by its potential customers, which again affects financial 
performance. Current research provides evidence on these arguments (Banerjee et al., 
2015). Therefore, we hypothesise that a firm with better ESG disclosure will have 
higher firm value. 
Fourth, ESG disclosure improves transparency and visibility in companies’ social and 
environmental factors and governance (Dubbink, Graafland & Van Liedekerke, 2008; 
Eccles, Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014). The latest research 
finds that not only social responsible funds but also conventional asset funds take 
ESG dimensions into consideration when they are making investment decisions 
(Duuren, Plantinga & Scholtens, 2015). Many conventional managers also use ESG 
factors particularly to assess risk. The more transparent is the ESG information 
disclosed, the better investment decisions these managers make.  
Lastly, ESG disclosure reduces agency costs by encouraging stakeholders to engage 
and by increasing transparency. Greater ESG disclosure is associated with better 
stakeholder engagement, lowering the likelihood of myopic decisions. Jo and Kim 
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(2007, 2008) report that the level of asymmetric information between insiders 
(managers) and outsiders (shareholders and stakeholders) will be decreased owing to 
enhanced corporate transparency through frequent and voluntary disclosure, thus 
discouraging managerial rent extraction (aggressive earnings management, insider 
trading, and related-party transactions), and therefore enhancing firm value. 
Furthermore, Bénabou & Tirole (2010) report that corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) policies help firms adopt a more long-term perspective by discouraging short-
term opportunistic behaviour, which boosts firms’ value in the long run. 
Earlier research on voluntary disclosure of financial information documents that the 
CEO has influence on disclosure quality, and high-quality disclosure increases firm 
value (e.g., Francis, Philbrick & Schipper, 1994; Botosan, 1997; Bushman & Smith, 
2001; Francis, Nanda & Olsson, 2008; Hui & Matsunaga, 2015). However, as far as 
we know, there is no literature exploring the CEO’s role in ESG disclosure, although 
Hui & Matsunaga (2015) provide anecdotal evidence that CEOs take responsibility 
for firms’ interaction with not only their investment community but also various other 
stakeholders. Our paper aims to investigate the CEO’s role in ESG disclosure, in 
particular whether or not CEO power impacts the relation between firm value and 
ESG disclosure.   
To rigorously investigate these effects, we employ a sample of 350 FTSE listed firms 
during the period 2004 to 2013. The dataset is created from the merging of two 
sources: Bloomberg, which provides accounting and ESG disclosure data, and 
Boardex, which provides governance data. The primary independent variable is the 
ESG disclosure score. Bloomberg rates a firm’s ESG disclosure on three dimensions: 
social, environmental, and governance. ESG scores indicate the rating that 
Bloomberg’s analysts give to the degree of transparency and accountability of a firm’s 
reporting on the ‘three pillars’ of ESG strategies, performance, and related activities. 
Note that, while other data providers may use ESG information and different models 
to estimate ESG scores, the Bloomberg survey requests information directly from 
companies. The data points are clear and original sources can be identified in 
company documents. The primary proxy for firm value is Tobin’s Q, originally 
proposed by Tobin (1969) and since then used widely in the literature to account for 
firm valuation (Yermack, 1996; Gompers, Metrick & Ishii, 2003). 
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The results confirm our assumption that firms with superior ESG disclosure have 
higher value, and that the relationship varies according to the level of CEO power. 
The robustness of our results are tested and confirmed in several ways. We substitute 
Tobin’s Q with the return on assets (ROA), also finding a positive association 
between ROA and ESG disclosure. We further investigate the relationships between 
these two variables and environmental and social disclosure, respectively, separately 
from that with the comprehensive index (i.e. ESG score) to ensure that our results are 
not dominated by one single factor, since recent research finds that investors may 
attach different weights to these factors (Chatterji & Levine, 2006; Duuren, Plantinga 
& Scholtens, 2015). The results are consistent with the main findings. In addition, we 
implement an IV approach to test whether our findings suffer from any endogeneity 
bias stemming from reverse causality – namely, that only rich firms can afford costly 
ESG disclosure. Finally, a two-stage Heckman (1979) estimation procedure with 
validity-tested instruments is applied to mitigate concerns over endogeneity or 
omitted-variable bias, and to further strengthen our claims regarding the directionality 
of our results. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Much of the literature has explored the relationship between ESG performance and 
firm value. However, the results have been equivocal, partly because of measurement 
concerns or data constraints, and partly because of model misspecification.  
Early studies examine the relationship between ESG information disclosure and firm 
value by focusing on specific environmental, social and ethical events. For example, 
Blacconiere & Patten (1994) document that investors react less negatively to 
companies with more environmental information disclosed than those with less 
information provided when an industrial disaster happened in the chemical industry.  
More recent studies have turned their attention to more general cases of ESG 
disclosure. Specifically, with a sample of Canadian companies, Richardson & Welker 
(2001) find an unexpected negative association between ESG disclosure and market 
value. In contrast, research such as that of Cormier & Magnan (2007) and Aerts, 
Cormier & Magnan (2008) documents a positive relationship. Aerts, Cormier & 
Magnan (2008) provide evidence that enhanced ESG disclosure among a sample of 
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EU (Belgian, French, German, and Dutch) and North American (Canadian and US) 
companies increased firm value by reducing information risk. Cormier & Magnan 
(2007), using a sample period from 1992 to 1998 for Canadian, German, and French 
companies, though failing to find a consistent result across all countries, provide 
evidence of a positive relationship. 
There are two main streams of integrated ESG research in terms of their key findings. 
One set of studies has concluded that the relationship is positive and suggests that the 
managerial skills of companies with good ESG performance are transferable to or 
synergised into corporate market activities. In other words, the stakeholder infers that 
a company with good ESG practices/reputation should also be able to perform well 
when competing in the market (Frooman, 1997; Schuler & Cording, 2006). Thus, the 
stakeholders (e.g., investors, consumers, and employees) will reward such ‘good 
management’ through investment, consumption, and higher productivity. Similarly, 
studies based on stakeholder theory suggest that mutual trust and cooperation with 
stakeholders reduce implicit and explicit costs for negotiating and contracting, and 
play a role in monitoring management, significantly reducing the likelihood of 
managers behaving opportunistically and pushing them to adopt a long-term 
orientation (Jones, 1995; Choi & Wang, 2009; Eccles, Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014). 
In contrast, two strands of empirical studies have explored a negative relationship 
between corporate ESG practices and financial performance. One strand suggests that 
managers who practise ESG activities neglect the opportunity cost of ESG actions 
and, consequently, sacrifice activities that would be more profitable for the company 
(Schuler & Cording, 2006). Over time, such ESG activities result in poor financial 
performance. The other strand is based on agency cost theory, which states that 
managers will engage in ESG practices for their own personal interests because 
monitoring such behaviour is not easy for shareholders (Schuler & Cording, 2006). 
This stream of research implies that managers who direct resources towards social 
projects fail to put those resources to their highest productive use and, over time, fail 
to maximise the firm's financial performance.  
To explain and examine such equivocal findings, Preston & O’Bannon (1997) analyse 
the competing theories and use survey data to understand firms’ social–financial 
performance association. They find that social and financial performance are strongly 
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positively associated with each other.  Their interpretations for this positive 
relationship are either due to ‘positive synergies’ or ‘available funding’. Dam & 
Scholtens (2015) further construct a coherent theoretical framework by incorporating 
both the supply and demand aspects of market participants, and also suggest that CSR 
and financial performance are theoretically positively associated with each other. In 
particular, they find that the announcement of firms’ social responsibility may induce 
its lower stock returns, but not necessarily decrease its market value. Their argument 
is supported by the 68 empirical studies examined in their paper.  
As suggested by Preston & O’Bannon (1997), ‘positive synergies’ and ‘available 
funding’ provide the best explanations for this observed positive relation. The positive 
synergies theory is consistent with the stakeholder theory that is applied in the broader 
CSR literature. For example, Baron (2008) suggests that a firm with better CSR 
performance can attract customers who value such expenditure and are thus inclined 
to pay more for what it produces and serves, employees who are happy to work harder 
thus increasing productivity, even investors who expect a lower financial return 
because they receive satisfaction from purchasing shares in a firm that makes social 
expenditures, and managers who may view CSR as a means to increase their personal 
satisfaction and social accumulation. Patterson (2013) also reports that voluntary ESG 
reporting and disclosure are expected to boost firms’ sales growth, attract talented 
employees, and reduce the cost of capital. ESG disclosure will thus enhance firm 
value in the long run. In addition, some stakeholders delegate their own social 
responsibility to firms, suggesting that firms’ social responsibility is positively related 
to stakeholders’ loyalty, which enhances firms’ operating performance. Firms with 
greater ESG disclosure appeal to customers who are likely to delegate their own social 
responsibility to firms, resulting in better financial performance in the future. For 
example, Lev, Petrovits & Radhakrishnan (2010) show that a firm’s philanthropy is 
positively correlated with its future revenue growth in industries that are quite 
sensitive to consumer perception. 
The available funding or affordability theory, rather than a causal effect from ESG 
disclosure to firm value, suggests a reverse causality. This theory claims that, 
although companies may wish to behave like a good corporate citizen, firms without 
sufficient financial resources cannot afford to engage in the costly social activities. 
Thus, the causality implied by the affordability model is that financial performance 
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leads to ESG practice/disclosure. Carroll (1979) argues that, by managing wisely for 
economic, then legal, and then ethical domains, managers can send resources towards 
their charitable contribution. Schuler & Cording (2006) suggest that companies such 
as Anheuser-Busch, Coca-Cola, Eli Lilly, Philip Morris, Target, etc., in devoting a 
portion of their pre-tax income to various charitable projects, is a group of companies 
fitting into this category. Preston, Sapienza & Miller (1991) and Preston & O’Bannon 
(1997) all find some evidence supporting this hypothesis; however, their conclusions 
are all based on small surveys of US corporations. Qiu, Shaukat & Tharyan (2014) 
conclude that past profitability drives current social disclosure, with research findings 
built on affordability theory, but do not find consistent results between environmental 
disclosure and profitability. In our study, we explicitly test for causal relationships 
between both environmental and social disclosure and firm value, in addition to 
testing for causality between combined ESG disclosure and firm value. Alongside our 
main test, we employ the IV and Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedures to 
determine whether there is a possibility that the affordability theory affects our main 
inference about the association.  
Since ESG information is a subset of non-financial reporting and does not follow a 
standardised format as financial information does, ESG disclosure tends to vary 
significantly (Elzahar, Hussainey, Mazzi & Tsalavoutas, 2015). Along these lines, 
earlier empirical research documents that ESG disclosure differs across companies 
and countries (e.g., Reverte, 2009; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014) due to the information 
content and format being up to management discretion. Duuren, Plantinga & 
Scholtens (2015) find that the US and European asset managers view ESG in 
substantially different ways. Baldini et al. (2016) argue that country-specific factors 
such as political, labour, and cultural systems, significantly affect firms’ ESG 
disclosure practices. Therefore, it is important to understand the relationship between 
ESG disclosure and financial performance within country-specific contextual factors. 
The UK is one of the leading countries when it comes to advocating ESG disclosure. 
It requires ESG disclosure in a firm’s Business Review, as laid out in the Companies 
Act (2006). It is expected that the Business Review of a quoted company must 
disclose a series of ESG information. Such information includes disclosure on the 
influence of the company’s business on the environment, information about the 
company’s employees, and social and community as well as any policies implemented 
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by the company regarding these issues and the effectiveness of those policies. These 
requirements provide a relatively clear data structure for ESG research in the UK 
compared to previous studies that have relied mostly on survey data (see, for example, 
Preston & O’Bannon, 1997; Duuren, Plantinga & Scholtens, 2015). We therefore 
investigate the relationship within a UK data setting.  
In sum, our study builds on previous and recent studies to address the inconsistent 
findings surrounding the relation between corporate ESG disclosure and financial 
value. These earlier findings lead to our first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive and significant relationship between ESG disclosure level 
and firm value. 
Different stakeholders or managers may have different reactions to corporate ESG 
practices. For instance, a firm's practice of donating to the local communities in which 
its stores operate may be praised by local employees but criticised by distant 
shareholders. Thus, a more fine-grained group analysis is required to better 
understand the relationship of ESG to firm value. One of the determinants of the 
importance of stakeholder–management subgroups depends on their relative power 
(Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). We emphasise one of the key decision-making 
groups, CEOs, who have the power of direct control over companies’ operations, and 
suggest that a necessary condition for better understanding the relationship between 
ESG disclosure and financial performance is to consider CEO power.  
A variety of studies has suggested that a CEO has the ability to influence disclosure 
policies. Song & Thakor (2006) provide evidence on the CEO’s incentive to control 
the information disclosed to the board. Other studies that recognise the CEO’s ability 
to influence information disclosure include Goldman & Slezak (2006), Singh (2006), 
and Axelson & Baliga (2009). Since disclosure quality reflects executives’ ability to 
understand the underlying competitive environment and effectively anticipate future 
outcomes, higher disclosure quality could signal executives’ ability to enhance firm 
value (Hui & Matsunaga, 2015). As the core of the executive team, the CEO’s efforts 
regarding ESG disclosure should be a key determinant of disclosure quality. Thus, we 
posit that increased firm value, led by ESG disclosure, will be stronger in the presence 
of greater CEO power, since stakeholders will then perceive the signalling effects of 
ESG disclosure to be a bigger commitment from the firm. 
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Furthermore, Chang, Dasgupta & Hilary (2010) document a mechanism through 
which disclosure quality is linked to CEO pay. They argue that the provision of high-
quality information requires managers to have a strong understanding of the 
underlying economic and competitive environment faced by the firm and to foresee 
how the firm will be able to succeed in that environment. Because similar skills are 
useful for making effective strategic and operating decisions, the quality of a firm’s 
financial disclosures signals the manager’s ability to increase firm value (Chang, 
Dasgupta & Hilary, 2010). Therefore, superior disclosure shifts the reservation wage 
in the labour market, leading to a positive relation between disclosure quality and pay. 
We therefore examine the role of CEO power, proxied by the CEO’s relative 
payment, in the relationship between ESG disclosure and firm value.  
However, it could be argued that CEOs with strong power are also protected by their 
authority.  Therefore, they may manipulate disclosure policy or obscure information 
transparency so that their rent seeking behaviour will not be revealed. If such an 
argument is the case, we would observe that strong CEO power might weaken the 
relation between ESG disclosure and firm value.  
Summarising the discussion above, we propose our second hypothesis: 
H2: The effect of ESG disclosure on firm value is more pronounced when the firm 
has high CEO power than when the firm has low CEO power. 
Figure 1 places CEO power within a conceptual framework illustrating its moderating 
role of ESG disclosure effect on firm value. 
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The lack of consensus over a measurement methodology in regard to ESG disclosure 
may also contribute to the equivocal empirical results in the literature. We use a 
comprehensive score developed by Bloomberg since early 2000 to proxy for ESG 
disclosure. Given its credibility, this proxy is also commonly applied in practice by 
companies.1 Further, we suggest that a breakdown of the ESG disclosure score into 
different subsets employing different measurement strategies is a necessary step when 
conducting any relationship tests, because ESG has different dimensions to which, as 
Chatterji & Levine (2006) and Duuren, Plantinga & Scholtens (2015) suggest, 
investors attach different weights.   
Likewise, there is little consensus over which instrument should be applied to measure 
financial performance. Many researchers use market measures such as the stock 
market return, while others propose accounting measures (ROA, ROE, etc.). We 
apply Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm value. We do not consider the stock 
market return because it is more closely related to the investor’s financial return than 
the stakeholder’s valuation. Meanwhile, Dam & Scholtens (2015) find that the 
association between stock returns and the level of social responsibility can either be 
positive or negative, depending ultimately on how strongly investors and firms, 
respectively, value the internalisation of external influence. Thus, we use Tobin’s Q, 
complemented by ROA, in this study. Each measure represents a particular 
perspective on the ways that firms’ financial performance is assessed. More 
specifically, the market-orientated measure is forward looking and focuses on market 
performance, while the accounting measure captures historical aspects of firm 
performance (Tsoutsoura, 2004). Tobin’s Q, calculated as the ratio of the market 
value of a firm (stock market-based orientation) to the replacement cost of its total 
assets (historical orientation), has been applied to explain many important aspects of 
corporate finance. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample and data  
 
ϭ^ĞĞ͕ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͕>W'ƌŽƵƉ͛ƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨŝƚƐ^'ƐĐŽƌĞƐŽŶŝƚƐǁĞďƐŝƚĞ͕ĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ
ŝƚƐƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ͘dŚĞƐĐŽƌĞƐƚŚĞǇƋƵŽƚĞĂƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůŽŽŵďĞƌŐƚĞƌŵŝŶĂů
;ŚƚƚƉƐ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĐůƉŐƌŽƵƉ͘ĐŽŵͬĞŶͬƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇͬƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇͲƌĂƚŝŶŐƐͬďůŽŽŵďĞƌŐͲĞƐŐͲĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞͿ͘
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To study the relationship between ESG disclosure level and firm valuation among 
FTSE 350 firms in the UK, we obtain data from the following sources: Bloomberg, 
which provides accounting, ESG disclosure, environmental disclosure, and social 
disclosure data; and Boardex, which provides CEOs’ and directors’ compensation 
data. To be able to perform our analysis, we require firms to have data available for 
net property, plant and equipment (PPE), total assets, total debts, sales, cash and near 
cash items, capital expenditure, Tobin’s Q, ROA, ESG disclosure data, environmental 
disclosure data and social disclosure data available from Bloomberg and CEO pay 
(CEO POWER) data available in Boardex. Our final sample contains 2,415 firm–year 
observations (main model) representing 367 individual firms between 2004 and 2013.  
3.2 Regression variables 
3.2.1 ESG disclosure measurement: ESG disclosure score 
Our main explanatory variable is the ESG disclosure score. Besides the mandatory 
requirements for basic disclosure, ESG disclosure is usually voluntary and, from the 
normative stakeholder point of view, regarded as an expression of transparency and 
accountability. Thus, the ESG disclosure score reflects a firm’s specific level of 
disclosure. Fortunately, Bloomberg provides ESG disclosure scores for large public 
firms. Since several proprietary databases have been developed in recent years, 
research has begun to use them to assess ESG disclosure or performance. However, 
Halbritter & Dorfleitner (2015) and Semenova & Hassel (2015) find that the ESG 
concepts in these datasets are non-consistent and do not converge; in addition, 
investigating the overall ESG score or some particular pillars may yield different 
results. However, given the datasets that they examined, Halbritter & Dorfleitner 
(2015) show that the Bloomberg subcriteria are fairly consistent with the overall 
measure. Therefore, we apply Bloomberg’s ESG score as an overall ESG measure and 
the individual pillars to address the concern that the relation between ESG disclosure 
and firm value might be driven by some specific dimensions.  
The ESG disclosure score proprietarily provided by Bloomberg is based on the extent 
of a company’s ESG disclosure, the data being compiled from all available firm 
information, including websites, CSR reports, annual reports, and Bloomberg surveys. 
By 2015, Bloomberg was providing ESG data on more than 11,300 public companies 
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who have the most active trading in 69 countries. The comprehensive score of ESG 
disclosure is calculated from a total of 120 indicators, covering three aspects: 
environment, social activities, and governance. The span is 0.1 (minimum disclosure) 
to 100. The weight attached to every data point is allocated according to its 
importance. Different industry sectors are also considered when constructing these 
scores. By this means, each company is only evaluated with regard to the data that are 
relevant to its industry sector.2 The score is widely used by academics (see, for 
example, Baldini et al., 2016), professionals, and companies, and the total number of 
customers using the ESG score was 12,078 by 2015.3
As some research indicates that ESG effects are driven by governance factors (e.g. 
Duuren, Plantinga & Scholtens, 2015), we want to relieve this concern by further 
examining our research questions using two individual ESG scores: an environmental 
disclosure score and a social disclosure score. These scores also come directly from 
Bloomberg.    
3.2.2 Empirical model for Hypothesis 1 
To test our first hypothesis, we propose that ESG disclosure is positively related to 
firm valuation. We test the following regression model, between firm valuation and 
the ESG disclosure score and a set of control variables: 
            ܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ௜ǡ௧= ߚ଴+ߚଵܧܵܩ௜ǡ௧+ߚଶܲܲܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܮܰܶܣ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܥܣܲܧܺ௜ǡ௧+ߚହܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧
                                +ߚ଺ܩܴܱܹܶܪ௜ǡ௧+ߚ଻ܥܣܵܪ௜ǡ௧+ ܻ݁ܽݎܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ௧  
                                +ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ௜+ߝ௜ǡ௧                                                (1)
Following Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz & Williamson (2010), we include the firm 
characteristics that are reported to be influencing firm valuation and financial 
performance. Specifically, PPE is calculated as the ratio of property, plant, and 
equipment to total sales, firm size is measured as the natural log of total assets 
(LNTA), CAPEX is measured as capital expenditure divided by total sales, 
LEVERAGE is measured as total debts divided by total assets, sales growth 
(GROWTH) is captured as the percentage change in sales over the prior year, and 
CASH is cash divided by total assets. To further test the relationship between ESG 
 
ϮdŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵůŽŽŵďĞƌŐ͛ƐϮϬϭϮ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇZĞƉŽƌƚĂŶĚŝƚƐϮϬϭϱ/ŵƉĂĐƚZĞƉŽƌƚhƉĚĂƚĞ͘
ϯdŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵůŽŽŵďĞƌŐ͛ƐϮϬϭϱ/ŵƉĂĐƚZĞƉŽƌƚhƉĚĂƚĞ͘
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disclosure and the firm’s financial performance, we also estimate the association 
between ESG disclosure and firm profitability as measured by ROA.  
3.2.3 Moderator: CEO power 
Our measure of CEO power is based on Veprauskaitơ & Adams (2013). They 
construct a variable termed CEO-Remuneration to proxy for CEO power. The proxy 
is defined as the annual compensation that the CEO received divided by the total 
annual compensation of all directors on the board. Boyd (1995) states that a powerful 
CEO may succeed in persuading the remuneration committee members to design 
generous compensation packages that bear little relation to real financial performance. 
Bebchuk, Cremers & Peyer (2011) state that the CEO’s remuneration may reflect 
his/her relative importance and ability to extract rents. Here, we measure the CEO’s 
pay ratio in the same way as that constructed in Veprauskaitơ & Adams (2013), and 
define an indicator variable to represent higher and lower CEO power.4 CEO POWER 
is set to one if the CEO pay ratio for a firm is in the top quartile of the distribution, 
otherwise it is set to zero.   
3.2.4 Empirical model for Hypothesis 2 
To test our second hypothesis that CEO power has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between ESG disclosure scores and firm value, we include CEO Power 
and an additional interaction term in our main regression:  
ܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧܵܩ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܥܧܱܱܹܲܧܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܧܵܩ௜ǡ௧ כ ܥܧܱܱܹܲܧܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅
ߚସܮܰܶܣ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܥܣܲܧܺ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܩܴܱܹܶܪ௜ǡ௧ ൅
ߚ଼ܥܣܵܪ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܲܲܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ௧ ൅
ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ௜൅ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺʹሻ
To further test whether CEO power positively moderates the relationship between 
ESG disclosure and a firm’s financial performance, we once again repeat the 
regression, replacing the dependent variable Tobin’s Q with ROA. 
 
ϰtĞĂůƐŽĂƉƉůǇKWKtZŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂƐĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ͕ƉĂǇƌĂƚŝŽ͕ƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂůůƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚĞƐƚƐ͕ĂŶĚ
ĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽƐƚƌŽŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƌĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŚĞƌĞ͘
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for all variables. We winsorize all variables 
at the 1% and 99% levels to control the effect of outliers. The average ESG disclosure 
score is 30.670 in our main model. In addition, the 25th and 75th percentiles are 21.900 
and 37.600, respectively, suggesting that there is sufficient variation in ESG 
disclosure level to examine the effect of ESG disclosure on firm value. Tobin’s Q has 
a mean of 1.791 (median = 1.471). Multicollinearity is not likely to be problematic in 
our multivariate test because no VIF (variance inflation factor) exceeds 10 for any of 
our explanatory variables (e.g., Hair et al., 2006). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N mean Std.dev. p25 p50 p75 
       
ESG 2,415 30.670 11.170 21.900 28.930 37.600 
Tobin’s Q 2,415 1.791 1.053 1.091 1.471 2.092 
CEO POWER 2,415 0.250 0.433 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 2,415 0.065 0.083 0.022 0.058 0.100 
PPE 2,415 0.927 2.569 0.059 0.179 0.479 
CAPEX 2,415 0.095 0.186 0.014 0.032 0.078 
LEVERAGE 2,415 0.219 0.178 0.064 0.198 0.326 
GROWTH 2,415 0.103 0.243 -0.006 0.066 0.166 
CASH 2,415 0.099 0.097 0.032 0.068 0.132 
LNTA 2,415 7.592 1.822 6.338 7.315 8.537 
SOC 2,364 32.080 12.440 22.810 28.070 38.600 
ENV 2,207 21.340 13.900 9.302 18.600 31.010 
      
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for all variables used in our regression models. 
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4.2  Main regression results5
Table 2 reports the results from estimating equation (1).  Panel A of Table 2 reports 
the results of estimating equation (1) using the ESG disclosure as a test variable. The 
estimated coefficient of ESG is 0.016 and is statistically significant at 1% level (t-
statistics = 8.729). Consistent with our prediction, the result indicates that firms with 
higher ESG disclosure have higher firm value. Using the summary data of ESG 
reported in Table 1, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the ESG 
disclosure leads to a 17.872% (0.016*11.170) increase in the value of Tobin’s Q. 
Turning to our other control variables, we find that the signs of their coefficients 
largely correspond with findings in the existing literature. First, firm size (LNTA) and 
the PPE are negatively related to Tobin’s Q, consistent with Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz & 
Williamson (2010). Second, consistent with Martinez-Sola, Garcia-Teruel & 
Martinez-Solano (2013) and Konijn, Krćssel & Lucas (2011), the ratio of cash to total 
assets (CASH) is positively associated with Tobin’s Q. Third, sales growth 
(GROWTH) is positively related to firm value, which corroborates the conjecture of 
King & Santor (2008).  
Each component (environmental, social, and governance) is equally weighted in the 
calculation of Bloomberg’s proprietary aggregate ESG disclosure score. According to 
Ammann, Oesch & Schmid (2011), firm-level corporate governance is positively 
associated with firm value, based on a previously unused dataset provided by 
Governance Metrics International (GMI) covering 64 individual corporate governance 
attributes. To show that our findings are not driven by the governance component, we 
change our independent variable of interest to an environmental disclosure score and a 
social disclosure score, respectively. As presented in Panel B of Table 2, when an 
environmental disclosure score is used as our test variable, the coefficient on ENV is 
positive and significant (t-statistics = 5.394), suggesting that our results are not driven 
by the governance component.  Panel C of Table 2 reports the results of estimating 
equation (1) using SOC as test variable. We show that the coefficient on SOC is 
 
ϱ'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞůĞŶŐƚŚǇĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƚĞƐƚƐǁĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ͕ǁĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇƌĞƉŽƌƚŽƵƌŵĂŝŶK>^
ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨŽƌŵŽĚĞůƐϭĂŶĚϮ͕ďƵƚĂůƐŽŽƵƌƌŽďƵƐƚŶĞƐƐƚĞƐƚƌĞƐƵůƚƐ͕ŝ͘Ğ͕͘ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚǁŽͲƐƚĂŐĞůĞĂƐƚ
ƐƋƵĂƌĞƐ;Ϯ^>^ͿĂŶĚ,ĞĐŬŵĂŶŵŽĚĞůƐ͕ŝŶƚŚĞƚĂďůĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƐŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇ͘
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positive and significant (t-statistics = 6.959), consistent with our findings in Panel A 
and Panel B.  
Table 2: The impact of ESG disclosure (ESG), environmental disclosure (ENV), and social 
disclosure (SOC) on firm value (Tobin’s Q).  
Panel A: The impact of ESG disclosure (ESG) on firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS HECKMAN 
   
ESG 0.016*** 0.019***  
(8.729) (6.667)  
ESG_DUM   0.277*** 
  (6.889) 
PPE -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.009 
 (-6.267) (-6.413) (-0.998) 
LNTA -0.190*** -0.201*** 0.425*** 
 (-14.962) (-14.182) (6.754) 
CAPEX 0.199 0.194 0.987*** 
(1.618) (1.583) (6.712) 
LEVERAGE 0.057 0.060 0.200* 
(0.471) (0.501) (1.682) 
GROWTH 0.468*** 0.480*** -0.327*** 
(5.601) (5.720) (-3.093) 
CASH 3.759*** 3.759*** 3.063*** 
 (12.113) (12.177) (10.138) 
LAMBDA   2.067*** 
  (8.778) 
Constant 2.097*** 2.106*** -5.266*** 
 (11.249) (11.372) (-6.154) 
   
Observations 2,415 2,415 2,415 
Adjusted ܴଶ 35.4% 35.4% 37.1% 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: The impact of environmental disclosure (ENV) on firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS HECKMAN 
   
ENV 0.007*** 0.012***  
(5.394) (5.789)  
ENV_DUM   0.118*** 
  (3.112) 
PPE -0.050*** -0.054*** 0.010 
(-6.505) (-6.949) (0.886) 
LNTA -0.147*** -0.170*** 0.364*** 
 (-12.807) (-12.599) (5.634) 
CAPEX 0.228* 0.227* 0.820*** 
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(1.722) (1.706) (5.521) 
LEVERAGE 0.107 0.121 0.225** 
(0.959) (1.103) (2.032) 
GROWTH 0.458*** 0.481*** -0.341*** 
(5.689) (5.928) (-2.856) 
CASH 3.334*** 3.344*** 2.461*** 
 (11.843) (11.920) (8.576) 
LAMBDA   1.917*** 
  (7.171) 
Constant 2.133*** 2.240*** -4.469*** 
 (11.353) (11.884) (-4.911) 
   
Observations 2,207 2,207 2,207 
Adjusted ܴଶ 31.8% 31.3% 32.8% 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: The impact of social disclosure (SOC) on firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS HECKMAN 
   
SOC 0.012*** 0.014***  
 (6.959) (5.046)  
SOC_DUM   0.243*** 
  (5.112) 
PPE -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.139*** 
 (-5.679) (-5.761) (-9.185) 
LNTA -0.168*** -0.175*** 0.526*** 
 (-14.050) (-12.845) (6.162) 
CAPEX 0.191 0.186 2.419*** 
 (1.537) (1.514) (7.508) 
LEVERAGE 0.070 0.066 1.368*** 
 (0.561) (0.532) (6.576) 
GROWTH 0.470*** 0.476*** 0.066 
 (5.339) (5.407) (0.709) 
CASH 3.859*** 3.850*** 4.757*** 
 (11.941) (11.980) (13.216) 
LAMBDA   2.692*** 
  (7.662) 
Constant 2.001*** 2.000*** -7.410*** 
 (10.513) (10.565) (-5.940) 
   
Observations 2,364 2,364 2,364 
Adjusted ܴଶ 35.3% 35.3% 36.8% 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Panel A of Table 2 (Model (1)) provides results of the regression of firms’ Tobin’s Q on their ESG 
disclosure score (ESG), which proxies for the firms’ ESG disclosure level. Models (2) and (3) examine the 
robustness of our main inference. Panel B, Model (1) provides results of the regression of firms’ Tobin’s Q on 
their environmental disclosure score (ENV), which proxies for their environmental disclosure level. Models (2) 
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and (3) again examine the robustness of our main inference. Panel C, Model (1) provides results of the 
regression of firms’ Tobin’s Q on their social disclosure score (SOC), which proxies for their social disclosure 
level. Models (2) and (3) again check the robustness of our main inference. ***, **, and * significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
4.3 Moderation test 
In Table 3 (Panel A), we examine the role of CEO power on the relationship between 
ESG disclosure level and firm value. In order to test the moderation hypothesis, the 
key variable of interest here is the interaction term (ESG * CEO POWER). The 
interaction term captures the difference in the effects of ESG disclosure on firm value 
between those with high and low CEO power firms. Equally important, the coefficient 
on ESG captures the effects of ESG disclosure for lower CEO power. The positive 
coefficient of ESG * CEO POWER (ߚଷ ൌ ͲǤͲͳʹǡ ݐ ൌ ͵Ǥ͵ʹͶሻ indicates that, 
controlling for other factors, the average increase in firm value led by ESG disclosure 
is larger for firms in which the CEO has greater power (Table 3, Panel A, Model (1)). 
Thus, for example, using Model (1), a one standard deviation increase in the ESG 
disclosure leads to a 13.404% increase (0.012*11.170) in the value of Tobin’s Q for 
firms with lower CEO power, and a one standard deviation increase in the ESG 
disclosure leads to a 26.808% increase (0.012*11.170+0.012*11.170) in the value of 
Tobin’s Q for firms with higher CEO power. Accordingly, supporting our second 
hypothesis, the interaction between ESG disclosure and CEO power positively 
influences firm value, suggesting that the positive relationship between ESG 
disclosure and firm value is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power.  
We also test the moderating effect of CEO power on the relationship between the 
environmental disclosure level and firm value (Panel B of Table 3) and the 
relationship between the social disclosure level and firm value (Panel C of Table 3). 
The coefficients of the interaction terms, ENV*CEO POWER and SOC*CEO 
POWER, are positive and significant at the 1% level, respectively. This finding 
suggests that the presence of a CEO with greater power positively moderates the 
association between the environmental disclosure score and firm value and that 
between the social disclosure score and firm value, which is consistent with our 
second hypothesis.  
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To sum up, the above analysis indicates that a higher ESG disclosure level increases 
firm value. Moreover, this relationship is stronger in the presence of greater CEO 
power.  
Table 3: The moderating effect of CEO power on the relationship between different measures 
of ESG-related disclosure and firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
Panel A: The moderating effect of CEO power on the relationship between ESG disclosure 
(ESG) and firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS HECKMAN 
   
ESG 0.012*** 0.015***  
(6.429) (5.162)  
CEO POWER -0.444*** -0.498*** -0.101** 
(-3.466) (-2.953) (-2.102) 
ESG*CEO POWER 0.012*** 0.014***  
(3.324) (2.757)  
ESG_DUM   0.203*** 
  (4.913) 
ESG_DUM*CEO POWER   0.289*** 
  (2.944) 
PPE -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.008 
(-6.135) (-6.271) (-0.855) 
LNTA -0.188*** -0.200*** 0.428*** 
(-14.855) (-14.026) (6.839) 
CAPEX 0.194 0.188 0.987*** 
(1.573) (1.533) (6.721) 
LEVERAGE 0.057 0.060 0.199* 
(0.477) (0.506) (1.677) 
GROWTH 0.463*** 0.474*** -0.332*** 
(5.535) (5.669) (-3.179) 
CASH 3.794*** 3.793*** 3.071*** 
(12.257) (12.324) (10.199) 
LAMBDA   2.074*** 
  (8.874) 
Constant 2.180*** 2.202*** -5.272*** 
(11.577) (11.629) (-6.204) 
   
Observations 2,415 2,415 2,415 
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Adjusted ܴଶ 35.8% 35.7% 37.4% 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 

Panel B: The moderating effect of CEO power on the relationship between environmental 
disclosure (ENV) and firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS HECKMAN 
   
ENV 0.005*** 0.011***  
 (3.632) (4.840)  
CEO POWER -0.194** -0.186* -0.040 
 (-2.549) (-1.877) (-0.890) 
ENV*CEO POWER 0.008*** 0.008*  
 (2.829) (1.798)  
ENV_DUM   0.070* 
  (1.794) 
ENV_DUM*CEO POWER   0.196** 
  (2.079) 
PPE -0.049*** -0.053*** 0.013 
 (-6.352) (-6.826) (1.085) 
LNTA -0.147*** -0.171*** 0.371*** 
 (-12.773) (-12.558) (5.777) 
CAPEX 0.229* 0.228* 0.830*** 
 (1.726) (1.710) (5.602) 
LEVERAGE 0.101 0.117 0.221** 
 (0.912) (1.066) (1.998) 
GROWTH 0.461*** 0.484*** -0.350*** 
 (5.695) (5.939) (-2.957) 
CASH 3.345*** 3.358*** 2.435*** 
 (11.933) (12.018) (8.530) 
LAMBDA   1.946*** 
  (7.327) 
Constant 2.164*** 2.273*** -4.556*** 
 (11.530) (11.984) (-5.041) 
   
Observations 2,207 2,207 2,207 
Adjusted ܴଶ 32.0% 31.5% 32.9% 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: The moderating effect of CEO power on the relationship between social disclosure 
(SOC) and firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS HECKMAN 
   
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
ϮϮ

Notes: Panel A, Model (1) provides results of a test of the moderating effect of CEO Power on the relationship 
between ESG disclosure and firm value. Models (2) and (3) examine the robustness of our main inference. Panel 
B, Model (1) provides results of a test of the moderating effect of CEO Power on the relationship between 
environmental disclosure (ENV) and firm value. Models (2) and (3) check the robustness of our main inference. 
Panel C, Model (1) provides results of a test of the moderating effect of CEO Power on the relationship between 
social disclosure (SOC) and firm value. Models (2) and (3) examine the robustness of our main inference. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
5. Sensitivity Test 
To further test both the relationship between ESG disclosure and firm value and the 
moderating effect of CEO power on that relationship, we change our dependent 
variable to ROA, as a sensitivity test. Tables 4, 5, and 6 (Model (1)) show that the 
impacts of ESG disclosure, environmental disclosure, and social disclosure, 
SOC 0.009*** 0.012***  
(5.390) (3.732)  
CEO POWER -0.402*** -0.362** -0.082* 
 (-3.019) (-2.233) (-1.684) 
SOC*CEO POWER 0.010*** 0.009*  
(2.749) (1.889)  
SOC_DUM   0.184*** 
  (3.649) 
SOC_DUM*CEO POWER   0.251** 
  (2.427) 
PPE -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.140*** 
 (-5.565) (-3.701) (-9.260) 
LNTA -0.169*** -0.176*** 0.527*** 
 (-14.008) (-11.529) (6.200) 
CAPEX 0.178 0.174 2.428*** 
(1.431) (1.090) (7.574) 
LEVERAGE 0.069 0.065 1.373*** 
(0.555) (0.576) (6.651) 
GROWTH 0.466*** 0.472*** 0.062 
(5.300) (6.114) (0.663) 
CASH 3.887*** 3.879*** 4.766*** 
 (12.054) (18.180) (13.212) 
LAMBDA   2.696*** 
  (7.729) 
Constant 2.088*** 2.077*** -7.396*** 
 (10.848) (9.979) (-5.972) 
   
Observations 2,364 2,364 2,364 
Adjusted ܴଶ 35.6% 35.5% 36.9% 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
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respectively, on firms’ financial performance are all positive and significant. 
Moreover, in Model (4) of the three tables, we also test the moderating effect of CEO 
power on those relationships. In Model (4) of Table 4 we report that the coefficient on 
ESG * CEO POWER has a positive value (ߚଷ=0.001, t=2.396). Meanwhile, in Tables 
5 and 6, respectively, the coefficients on ENV*CEO POWER and SOC*CEO 
POWER are both positive, and significant at the 5% level.  
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6.  Robustness Tests 
To check the robustness of our main findings that the ESG disclosure level is 
positively associated with firm value and that firm value is positively associated 
with the interaction of the ESG disclosure score and CEO power, several 
robustness tests are performed. The results are discussed in this section. They 
are all consistent with our main hypotheses. 
To control for any endogeneity bias stemming from reverse causality, 
specifically that firms with higher valuation or that have performed better in the 
past might be able to afford or support higher ESG disclosure levels and more 
ESG-related investment, we re-estimate our analysis using the IV approach and 
report our findings here (the results are presented in Model (2) of Tables 2 and 
3, and Models (2) and (5) of Tables 4, 5, and 6). 
First, we implement the IV estimation procedure to check whether our results 
suffer from endogeneity between ESG disclosure and firm value. We follow 
Attig, Ghoul, Guedhami & Suh (2013) in using the firm-level initial value of the 
ESG disclosure score (ESG_INI) as an instrument. This IV is very likely to be 
exogenous to the contemporaneous ESG disclosure score. We employ a two-
step regression to estimate the IV model. First, we regress the ESG disclosure 
level on the IV and all the control variables used in the main regression model 
(Table 2, Panel A, Model (1)). Second, we preserve the predicted value of the 
ESG disclosure level and fit it into our baseline model. The first-stage 
regression findings show that the IV is significantly related to the ESG 
disclosure score. Due to space constraints, we do not present the results in a 
table. We then save the predicted value of the ESG disclosure score and use it 
rather than the ESG disclosure score in the regression examining the impact of 
the ESG disclosure score on firm value. We present the 2SLS regression results 
in Model (2) (Panel A of Table 2). The findings are consistent with our main 
prediction that the ESG disclosure level is positively and significantly 
associated with firm value (t-statistics = 6.667), suggesting that endogeneity 
does not drive our main findings. 
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Second, we follow Harjoto & Jo (2009) and use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage 
estimation procedure to solve the potential endogeneity of ESG disclosure. 
First, we redefine the ESG disclosure score into a dummy variable (ESG_DUM) 
coded one for firm-level ESG disclosure in the top quartile of the distribution. 
In the first step, a probit model regression using ESG_DUM as the dependent 
variable is carried out. The explanatory variables in the first-stage probit 
regression include all the control variables from the baseline model (Table 2, 
Panel A, Model (1)), and industry and year dummy variables.6 The estimated 
parameters from the first-stage probit regression model are used to calculate the 
self-selection parameter LAMBDA (or inverse Mill’s ratio), which is 
incorporated as an additional explanatory variable in the second-stage OLS 
estimation. Using Heckman’s two-stage selection model, we correct the 
specification for endogeneity and test whether ESG disclosure enhances firm 
value. The second-stage regression (Table 2, Panel A, Model (3)) results 
suggest that the positive relationship between ESG disclosure and firm value is 
maintained (t-statistics = 6.889). The coefficient on LAMBDA is significant in 
the second-stage regression, implying that the firm characteristics making them 
choose to disclose more ESG-related information are significantly associated 
with firm value. Following the same procedure, we implement robustness tests 
for all our models. Although we fail to find the interaction term (ENV*CEO 
POWER) significant in the both Heckman  and 2SLS models and (SOC*CEO 
POWER) significant in the 2SLS model when regressed on ROA, respectively, 
we find the remaining results to be consistent with our two main hypotheses. 
7. Conclusion and limitations 
We investigate in this paper whether superior ESG disclosure affects firm value 
by using a large sample of UK public firms from the Bloomberg database over 
the period 2004-2013. We document that the ESG disclosure level is positively 
associated with firm value, and find that the interaction between higher CEO 
power and ESG disclosure is positively related to firm value. This evidence is 
strong and consistent for three different measures of ESG-related disclosure, 
 
ϲtĞĚŽŶŽƚƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶĂƚĂďůĞĨŽƌƐƉĂĐĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ;ƐĞĞƉƉĞŶĚŝǆ͘ϭĨŽƌĚĞƚĂŝůƐͿ͘
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i.e., the ESG, environmental, and social disclosure scores. Our results hold 
when we use two different financial measures, i.e., Tobin’s Q and ROA, an IV 
approach, and the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation approach. 
Our findings suggest that ESG disclosures can enhance firm value through 
improved transparency and accountability, and enhanced stakeholder trust. In 
addition, the association between ESG disclosure level and firm value is more 
pronounced when CEO power is greater, indicating that shareholders treat ESG 
disclosure from firms with higher CEO power as associated with greater 
commitment to ESG practice. A variety of studies has suggested that the CEO is 
able to influence information and disclosure policy. These include Goldman & 
Slezak (2006), Singh (2006), and Axelson & Baliga (2009). Since disclosure 
quality reflects the executives’ ability to appreciate the underlying competitive 
environment and effectively anticipate future outcomes, higher disclosure 
quality could signal their ability to enhance firm value (Hui & Matsunaga, 
2015).  
While we show that superior ESG disclosure may add firm value and that CEO 
power positively moderates the relationship between ESG disclosure level and 
firm value, we emphasize that our study is not free of limitations. First, although 
we identify CEO power as a positive moderator of the relationship, we believe 
there may be other moderators affecting this relationship, such as ownership 
structures, executive incentives, and product market competition, but they are 
not considered in this study. It would be interesting to explore them in future 
work. Second, our sample consists only of large UK public firms, due to data 
constraints, which impede the generalisation of our inferences. Future research 
could include small and medium-sized firms, which have different reputational 
costs to large firms. 
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Appendix A.1 Probit model results
This table shows the results from probit regressions with ESG_DUM as the dependent 
variable. ESG_DUM is an indicator variable that set to one for firm-level ESG 
disclosure in the top quantile of the distribution.  
Dependent variable        ESG_DUM 
CAPEX -0.133 
(-0.526) 
PPE 0.070*** 
(3.560) 
CASH -0.198 
(-0.405) 
LNTA 0.446*** 
(17.969) 
LEVERAGE -0.069 
(-0.293) 
GROWTH -0.510*** 
(-3.779) 
Constant -4.910*** 
(-10.598) 
Pseudo R-Squared           0.290 
Industry dummy Yes 
Year dummy Yes 
           Z-statistics in parenthese   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 

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performance measurement. California Management Review, 48(2), 29–51.
ŚĞŶ͕Y͕͘'ŽůĚƐƚĞŝŶ͕/͕͘Θ:ŝĂŶŐ͕t͘;ϮϬϬϲͿ͘WƌŝĐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇ
ƚŽƐƚŽĐŬƉƌŝĐĞ͘ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕ϮϬ;ϯͿ͕ϲϭϵʹϲϱϬ͘
ŚĞŶŐ͕͕͘ /ŽĂŶŶŽƵ͕ /͕͘Θ^ĞƌĂĨĞŝŵ͕'͘ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ͘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ
ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ͘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ:ŽƵƌŶĂů͕ϯϱ;ϭͿ͕ϭʹϮϯ͘
ŚŽ͕ ͘ ,͕͘ WĂƚƚĞŶ͕ ͘ D͕͘ Θ ZŽďĞƌƚƐ͕ Z͘ t͘ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ͘ ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͗ Ŷ
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƐ͕ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͕
ĂŶĚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŚŝĐƐ͕ϲϳ;ϮͿ͕ϭϯϵʹϭϱϰ͘
ŚŽŝ͕:͕͘ΘtĂŶŐ͕,͘;ϮϬϬϵͿ͘^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ:ŽƵƌŶĂů͕ϯϬ;ϴͿ͕ϴϵϱʹϵϬϳ͘
ŽƌŵŝĞƌ͕͕͘ΘDĂŐŶĂŶ͕D͘;ϮϬϬϳͿ͘dŚĞƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŽ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐΖǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĨŝƌŵΖƐĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ͗ŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ͘ĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϲϮ;ϯͿ͕ϲϭϯʹϲϮϲ͘
Ăŵ͕>͕͘Θ^ĐŚŽůƚĞŶƐ͕͘;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘dŽǁĂƌĚĂƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐ͗KŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ͘ZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĂŶĚŶĞƌŐǇĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϰϭ͕ϭϬϯʹϭϮϭ͘
ŚĂůŝǁĂů͕͘^͕͘>ŝ͕K͘͕͘dƐĂŶŐ͕͕͘ΘzĂŶŐ͕z͘'͘;ϮϬϭϭͿ͘sŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇŶŽŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ ĐŽƐƚ ŽĨ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů͗ dŚĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ͘dŚĞ
ĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐZĞǀŝĞǁ͕ϴϲ;ϭͿ͕ϱϵʹϭϬϬ͘
ƵďďŝŶŬ͕t͕͘'ƌĂĂĨůĂŶĚ͕ :͕͘ΘsĂŶ>ŝĞĚĞŬĞƌŬĞ͕>͘ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ͘^Z͕ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞŽĨ
ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŚŝĐƐ͕ϴϮ;ϮͿ͕ϯϵϭʹϰϬϲ͘
ƵƵƌĞŶ͕ ͕͘ WůĂŶƚŝŶŐĂ͕ ͕͘ Θ ^ĐŚŽůƚĞŶƐ͕ ͘ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘ ^' ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ͗ &ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƌĞŝŶǀĞŶƚĞĚ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ƚŚŝĐƐ͕
ĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐ͕ϭʹϵ͘
ĐĐůĞƐ͕Z͘'͕͘ /ŽĂŶŶŽƵ͕ /͕͘Θ ^ĞƌĂĨĞŝŵ͕'͘ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ͘dŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽŶ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕ϲϬ;ϭϭͿ͕ϮϴϯϱʹϮϴϱϳ͘
ĐĐůĞƐ͕ Z͘ '͕͘ ^ĞƌĂĨĞŝŵ͕ '͕͘ Θ <ƌǌƵƐ͕ D͘ W͘ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ͘ DĂƌŬĞƚ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ŶŽŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƉƉůŝĞĚŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ͕Ϯϯ;ϰͿ͕ϭϭϯʹϭϮϳ͘
ůǌĂŚĂƌ͕,͕͘,ƵƐƐĂŝŶĞǇ͕<͕͘DĂǌǌŝ͕&͕͘ΘdƐĂůĂǀŽƵƚĂƐ͕/͘;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨŬĞǇ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐΖ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ͘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ͕ϯϵ͕
ϵϲʹϭϭϮ͘
&ƌĂŶĐŝƐ͕:͕͘EĂŶĚĂ͕͕͘ΘKůƐƐŽŶ͕W͘;ϮϬϬϴͿ͘sŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ͕ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐƋƵĂůŝƚǇ͕ĂŶĚĐŽƐƚŽĨ
ĐĂƉŝƚĂů͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕ϰϲ;ϭͿ͕ϱϯʹϵϵ͘
&ƌĂŶĐŝƐ͕ :͕͘ WŚŝůďƌŝĐŬ͕ ͕͘ Θ ^ĐŚŝƉƉĞƌ͕ <͘ ;ϭϵϵϰͿ͘ ^ŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕ϯϮ;ϮͿ͕ϭϯϳͲϭϲϰ͘
&ƌŽŽŵĂŶ͕ :͘ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ͘ ^ŽĐŝĂůůǇ ŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĂŶĚ ŝůůĞŐĂů ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ĂŶĚ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ǁĞĂůƚŚ͗ 
ŵĞƚĂͲĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ͘ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐΘ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ͕ϯϲ;ϯͿ͕ϮϮϭϮϰϵ͘
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'ĂƌĂǇ͕>͕͘Θ&ŽŶƚ͕y͘;ϮϬϭϮͿ͘ŽŝŶŐŐŽŽĚƚŽĚŽǁĞůů͍ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ͕
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐ ŝŶ ƐŵĂůů ĂŶĚ ŵĞĚŝƵŵ ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ͘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ,ŽƐƉŝƚĂůŝƚǇDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ϯϭ;ϮͿ͕ϯϮϵʹϯϯϳ͘
'ŽůĚŵĂŶ͕ ͕͘ Θ ^ůĞǌĂŬ͕ ^͘ >͘ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ͘ Ŷ ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϴϬ;ϯͿ͕ϲϬϯʹϲϮϲ͘
'ŽůĚƐƚĞŝŶ͕/͕͘ΘzĂŶŐ͕>͘;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚƌĂĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶ͘dŚĞ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ͕ϳϬ;ϰͿ͕ϭϳϮϯʹϭϳϲϱ͘
'ŽŵƉĞƌƐ͕ W͘ ͕͘DĞƚƌŝĐŬ͕ ͕͘ Θ /ƐŚŝŝ͕ :͘ >͘ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ͘ /ZZ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂƚĂ /ZZ ʹ ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐĂƚĂƐĞƚƐ͘dŚĞYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϭϭϴ͕ϭ͘
,ĂůďƌŝƚƚĞƌ͕'͕͘ΘŽƌĨůĞŝƚŶĞƌ͕'͘;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘dŚĞǁĂŐĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇʹǁŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚŚĞǇ͍
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ^'ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐ͘ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕Ϯϲ͕Ϯϱʹϯϱ͘
,Ăŝƌ͕:͘&͕͘ůĂĐŬ͕t͘͕͘ĂďŝŶ͕͘:͕͘ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ͕Z͘͕͘ΘdĂƚŚĂŵ͕Z͘>͘;ϮϬϬϲͿ͘DƵůƚŝǀĂƌŝĂƚĞĚĂƚĂ
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ;ϲƚŚĞĚ͘Ϳ͘hƉƉĞƌ^ĂĚĚůĞZŝǀĞƌ͕E:͗WĞĂƌƐŽŶWƌĞŶƚŝĐĞ,Ăůů͘
,ĂƌũŽƚŽ͕D͘͕͘Θ :Ž͕,͘ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ͘ KƉŽǁĞƌ ĂŶĚ ĨŝƌŵƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͗  ƚĞƐƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŝĨĞͲĐǇĐůĞ
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ͘ƐŝĂͲWĂĐŝĨŝĐ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ͕ϯϴ;ϭͿ͕ϯϱʹϲϲ͘
,ĞĐŬŵĂŶ͕ :͘ :͘ ;ϭϵϳϵͿ͘^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞůƐ ĨŽƌĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞƉĂŶĞůĚĂƚĂ͘ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ
ĂŶĚ'ƌĂĚƵĂƚĞ^ĐŚŽŽůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ͕hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨŚŝĐĂŐŽ͘
,Ƶŝ͕<͘t͕͘ΘDĂƚƐƵŶĂŐĂ͕^͘Z͘;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘ƌĞKƐĂŶĚ&KƐƌĞǁĂƌĚĞĚĨŽƌĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ͍
dŚĞĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐZĞǀŝĞǁ͕ϵϬ;ϯͿ͕ϭϬϭϯʹϭϬϰϳ͘
/ŽĂŶŶŽƵ͕/͕͘Θ^ĞƌĂĨĞŝŵ͕'͘;ϮϬϭϰͿ͘dŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ
ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ͗ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵĨŽƵƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘,ĂƌǀĂƌĚƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ^ĐŚŽŽůZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚtŽƌŬŝŶŐWĂƉĞƌ͕
;ϭϭͲϭϬϬͿ͘
:Ž͕,͕͘Θ<ŝŵ͕z͘;ϮϬϬϳͿ͘ŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂŶĚĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϴϰ;ϮͿ͕ϱϲϭʹϱϵϬ͘
:Ž͕,͕͘Θ<ŝŵ͕z͘;ϮϬϬϴͿ͘ƚŚŝĐƐĂŶĚĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ͗ƐƚƵĚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨĨŝƌŵƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĂƐŽŶĞĚĞƋƵŝƚǇŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƐŵĂƌŬĞƚ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŚŝĐƐ͕ϴϬ;ϰͿ͕ϴϱϱʹϴϳϴ͘
:ŽŶĞƐ͕ d͘ D͘ ;ϭϵϵϱͿ͘ /ŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ͗  ƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐ ŽĨ ĞƚŚŝĐƐ ĂŶĚ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͘ĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚZĞǀŝĞǁ͕ϮϬ;ϮͿ͕ϰϬϰʹϰϯϳ͘
<ŝŶŐ͕D͘Z͕͘Θ^ĂŶƚŽƌ͕͘;ϮϬϬϴͿ͘&ĂŵŝůǇǀĂůƵĞƐ͗KǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͕ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĐĂƉŝƚĂů
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĂŶĂĚŝĂŶĨŝƌŵƐ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨĂŶŬŝŶŐΘ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ͕ϯϮ;ϭϭͿ͕ϮϰϮϯʹϮϰϯϮ͘
<ŽŶŝũŶ͕^͘:͕͘<ƌćƵƐƐů͕Z͕͘Θ>ƵĐĂƐ͕͘;ϮϬϭϭͿ͘ůŽĐŬŚŽůĚĞƌĚŝƐƉĞƌƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĨŝƌŵǀĂůƵĞ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ
ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ͕ϭϳ;ϱͿ͕ϭϯϯϬʹϭϯϯϵ
>Ğǀ͕͕͘WĞƚƌŽǀŝƚƐ͕͕͘ΘZĂĚŚĂŬƌŝƐŚŶĂŶ͕^͘;ϮϬϭϬͿ͘/ƐĚŽŝŶŐŐŽŽĚŐŽŽĚĨŽƌǇŽƵ͍,ŽǁĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
ĐŚĂƌŝƚĂďůĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞ ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ͘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ :ŽƵƌŶĂů͕ϯϭ;ϮͿ͕
ϭϴϮʹϮϬϬ͘
DĂĚƐĞŶ͕W͘D͕͘ΘZŽĚŐĞƌƐ͕͘ :͘ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘>ŽŽŬŝŶŐŐŽŽĚďǇĚŽŝŶŐŐŽŽĚ͗dŚĞĂŶƚĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ƌĞůŝĞĨ͘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
:ŽƵƌŶĂů͕ϯϲ;ϱͿ͕ϳϳϲʹϳϵϰ͘
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DĂƌƚşŶĞǌͲ^ŽůĂ͕͕͘'ĂƌĐşĂͲdĞƌƵĞů͕W͘:͕͘ΘDĂƌƚşŶĞǌͲ^ŽůĂŶŽ͕W͘;ϮϬϭϯͿ͘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĐĂƐŚŚŽůĚŝŶŐ
ĂŶĚĨŝƌŵǀĂůƵĞ͘ƉƉůŝĞĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϰϱ;ϮͿ͕ϭϲϭʹϭϳϬ͘
DĐ'ƵŝƌĞ͕ :͘ ͕͘ ^ƵŶĚŐƌĞŶ͕ ͕͘ Θ ^ĐŚŶĞĞǁĞŝƐ͕ d͘ ;ϭϵϴϴͿ͘ ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ
ĨŝƌŵĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘ĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ:ŽƵƌŶĂů͕ϯϭ;ϰͿ͕ϴϱϰʹϴϳϮ͘
DĐtŝůůŝĂŵƐ͕ ͕͘ Θ ^ŝĞŐĞů͕ ͘ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ͘ ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ͗  ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ͘ĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚZĞǀŝĞǁ͕Ϯϲ;ϭͿ͕ϭϭϳʹϭϮϳ͘
DŝƚĐŚĞůů͕ Z͘ <͕͘ ŐůĞ͕ ͘ Z͕͘ Θ tŽŽĚ͕ ͘ :͘ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ͘ dŽǁĂƌĚ Ă ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐĂůŝĞŶĐĞ͗ĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨǁŚŽĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƌĞĂůůǇĐŽƵŶƚƐ͘ĐĂĚĞŵǇŽĨ
DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚZĞǀŝĞǁ͕ϮϮ;ϰͿ͕ϴϱϯʹϴϴϲ͘
WĂƚƚĞƌƐŽŶ͕:͘;ϮϬϭϯͿ͘dŚĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞĂŶĚƉƌŽĨŝƚƐ͘
ZĞƚƌŝĞǀĞĚĨƌŽŵŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬŶĞǁƐ͘ǀĂŶĚĞƌďŝůƚ͘ĞĚƵ͘
WƌĞƐƚŽŶ͕ >͘ ͕͘ Θ KΖĂŶŶŽŶ͕ ͘ W͘ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ͘ dŚĞ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂůʹĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ͘ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐΘ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ͕ϯϲ;ϰͿ͕ϰϭϵʹϰϮϵ͘
WƌĞƐƚŽŶ͕ >͘ ͘ ĂŶĚ ^ĂƉŝĞŶǌĂ͕ ,͘ ;ϭϵϵϬͿ͘ ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂůĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϭϵ;ϰͿ͕ϯϲϭʹϯϳϱ͘
WƌĞƐƚŽŶ͕ >͕͘ ^ĂƉŝĞŶǌĂ͕ ,͘ ΘDŝůůĞƌ͕ Z͘ ;ϭϵϵϭͿ ͚^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ͕ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ͕ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ͗ tŚŽ
ŐĂŝŶƐ ǁŚĂƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͍͟ ŝŶ ͘ ƚǌŝŽŶŝ ĂŶĚ W͘ >ĂǁĞƌĞŶĐĞ ;ĞĚƐ͘Ϳ͕ ^ŽĐŝŽͲ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͗dŽǁĂƌĚƐĂEĞǁ^ǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐ͘ƌŵŽŶŬ͕Ez͗D͘͘^ŚĂƌƉĞ͘
YŝƵ͕ z͕͘ ^ŚĂƵŬĂƚ͕ ͕͘Θ dŚĂƌǇĂŶ͕ Z͘ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ͘ ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞƐ͗ >ŝŶŬǁŝƚŚ
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐZĞǀŝĞǁ͕ĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐ͘
ZĞǀĞƌƚĞ͕ ͘ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ͘ ĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ ďǇ
^ƉĂŶŝƐŚůŝƐƚĞĚĨŝƌŵƐ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŚŝĐƐ͕ϴϴ;ϮͿ͕ϯϱϭʹϯϲϲ͘
ZŝĐŚĂƌĚƐŽŶ͕͘:͕͘ΘtĞůŬĞƌ͕D͘;ϮϬϬϭͿ͘^ŽĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ͕ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨ
ĞƋƵŝƚǇĐĂƉŝƚĂů͘ĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ͕KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ͕Ϯϲ;ϳͿ͕ϱϵϳʹϲϭϲ͘
ZŽǁůĞǇ͕ d͕͘ Θ ĞƌŵĂŶ͕ ^͘ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ͘  ďƌĂŶĚ ŶĞǁ ďƌĂŶĚ ŽĨ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐΘƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ͕ϯϵ;ϰͿ͕ϯϵϳʹϰϭϴ͘
^ĐŚƵůĞƌ͕ ͘ ͕͘ Θ ŽƌĚŝŶŐ͕D͘ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ͘  ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞʹĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂů ŵŽĚĞů ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ͘ĐĂĚĞŵǇ ŽĨ DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ZĞǀŝĞǁ͕ϯϭ;ϯͿ͕
ϱϰϬʹϱϱϴ͘
^ĞŵĞŶŽǀĂ͕ E͕͘ Θ ,ĂƐƐĞů͕ >͘ '͘ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘ KŶ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ
ŵĞƚƌŝĐƐ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŚŝĐƐ͕ϭϯϮ;ϮͿ͕ϮϰϵʹϮϱϴ͘
^ŝŶŐŚ͕ Z͘ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ͘ /ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ͘ǀĂŝůĂďůĞ Ăƚ ^^ZE
ϱϳϰϮϴϭ͘
^ŽŶŐ͕ &͕͘ Θ dŚĂŬŽƌ͕ ͘ s͘ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ͘ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů͕ ĐĂƌĞĞƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ͘dŚĞ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ͕ϲϭ;ϰͿ͕ϭϴϰϱʹϭϴϵϲ͘
^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ^ƚŽĐŬ ǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ;^^Ϳ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ͘  ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ^ƚŽĐŬ ǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ /ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ͗ DŽĚĞů
'ƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ ZĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ^' /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ /ŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ͘ ǁǁǁ͘ƐƐĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ͘ŽƌŐͬǁƉͲ
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚͬƵƉůŽĂĚƐͬϮϬϭϱͬϬϵͬ^^ͲDŽĚĞůͲ'ƵŝĚĂŶĐĞͲŽŶͲZĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐͲ^'͘ƉĚĨ͘
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dŽďŝŶ͕ :͘ ;ϭϵϲϵͿ͘  ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ DŽŶĞǇ͕
ƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚĂŶŬŝŶŐ͕ϭ;ϭͿ͕ϭϱʹϮϵ͘
dƐŽƵƚƐŽƵƌĂ͕D͘;ϮϬϬϰͿ͘ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ
ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ͕ĞƌŬĞůĞǇ͕͘
sĞƉƌĂƵƐŬĂŝƚĦ͕͕͘ΘĚĂŵƐ͕D͘;ϮϬϭϯͿ͘ŽƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĐŚŝĞĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨh<ĨŝƌŵƐ͍dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐZĞǀŝĞǁ͕ϰϱ;ϯͿ͕ϮϮϵʹϮϰϭ͘
sŝůĂŶŽǀĂ͕D͕͘ >ŽǌĂŶŽ͕ :͘D͕͘Θ ƌĞŶĂƐ͕͘ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ͘ ǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ZĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŚŝĐƐ͕ϴϳ;ϭͿ͕ϱϳʹϲϵ͘
zĞƌŵĂĐŬ͕ ͘ ;ϭϵϵϲͿ͘ ,ŝŐŚĞƌ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ƐŵĂůů ďŽĂƌĚ ŽĨ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ͘:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ͕ϰϬ;ϮͿ͕ϭϴϱʹϮϭϭ͘




